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During the 1950s Black resistance to the Apartheid system developed on  ay^. unprecedented 
scale. It created a mood of optimism amongst the resistance leadership - freedom would 
be won in their lifetime. They were convinced that they had a potent weapon to back 
their demands - mass action of the numerically superior African population. M'ass 
action would pressure the minority White govemsnent to accede to fundamental political 
change. This paper attempts to assess the potential of the most important form of mass 
action during the period - the political strike cmpaigns - in achieving this end. 
It could be argued that during the 1950s the objective conditions were ripe 
for the transfor~lation of isolated, sporadic resistance into mass resistance. Dwing 
the post-war period capital accumulated at an extremely fast, albeit uneven rate. 
This was spearheaded by the growth of the manufacturing sector and was accompa;nied by 
the continued concentration of Africans in the urban areas; renewed efforts by the 
State to control. more effectively the movement of Black labour and surplus population 
through the establishment of labour bureaux and the tightening of influx control; 
changes in the labour process and declining real wages. (1) The transformation of 
resistance does not occur automatically, however: it depends upon political 
organization and leadership. O'Meara has outlined how the repression of the l946 
mineworkers' strike acted catalytically on the established leadership of the ANC, 
leading to the effective takeover by the Youth &@ague and the forging of links between 
Black trade unions, the AWC, the CF and the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses. (2) 
With the adoption of the Programme of Action in 1949, there was an important shift in 
strategy from trying to achieve individual participation in the system through 
constitutional protests to direct action involving the masses. A section of the 
prograanme called for a national stoppage of work for one daiy as a mark of protest 
against the reactionary policy of the government. (3) 
The executive committee of the Transvaal ANC, in co-operation with the 
Johanneebug district CP and the Transvaal Indian Congress, called for a one-w work 
stoppage for May lst, as a protest against the introduction of the Suppression of 
Communism Act. The organizationa7_ build-up was thorough, with the Council of Non- 
European Trade Unions (cXE?TU) playing n vital role. They stressed that a carefully 
planned progranme of organizational. work leading up to ffie event was essential for 
the mobilization of workers. The build-up consisted of ANC and trade union branch 
meetings followed by mass township meetings, culminating ia a a s s  rally at Market 
Square, Johannesburg, a week before the strike. These efforts led to a successful 
strike, when on Naiy Day the majoritr of workers in m m y  areas withheld their labour 
power, despite the large-scale mobilization of police and defence force units, 
widespread liquor raids and arrests for pass law infringements. Factories were 
closed, commercial enterprises disrupted and deliveries of milk and other foodstuffs 
were affected. (4) Later in the day rioting flared up in Benoni, Orlando, Alexandra, 
Sophiatom and Brakpan tohmships as police attempted to break up gatherings. 
Nineteen died and thirty-ei&t were injured. 
Commenting on these events, the &KC year-end report concluded: 
... the events showed qucite clearly that conditions 
under which the African people live have become 
intolerable and that the masses are marching ahead of 
the leadership. Th9 graxi-by of this development among 
the masses is no doubt a serious one to %he leadership 
of the African people. (5) 
The central issue is the direction in which the leadership channelled this militancy. 
Even the most radical elements of the leadership viewed mass action of the proletariat 
as a means to pressure the Apartheid State i ~ t o  incorporating Blacks into the existiw 
political process, rather than challenging the subjugation of labour to capital. The 
May Day strike did not lead to refomn but to repression, as police carried out massive 
reprisal raids. (6) 
Despite the intimidatom measures, a f'urther strike was plazmed, this time 
on a national scale, to coincide with the introduction in parliament of the Unlawful 
Organizations Bill and to serveqlas a day of nouming for all those Africavas who lost 
their lives in the struggle for liberation". (7) On June 26th, reaction to the call 
was uneven. The strike was most effective in Port Elizabeth, where the harbour was 
bro@t to a standstill as only nine of the 1,000 dock workers reported for duty, and 
amongst the Durban Indian community. Contrary to expectations, the response on the 
Witwatersrand, except for Evaton and Alexandsa townships, was poor. The pattern of 
the response reveals the role played by political organizations in the canpaign, as 
well as hi&li&ting an important lesson: the need to gauge carefully the barometer 
of proletarian mood before embarking on political mass action. The response of the 
Port Elizabeth workers was indicative of the level of Black trade unionism in the 
city and theis linkage with the ANC. In Natal, Black trade unions were at th5s point 
poorly organized and the ANC, under the leadership of Champion, was weak and divorced 
froa the working class. In contrast, the solidarity of the Indian community was the 
product of an active Indian Congress which had only just moved through a period of 
passive resistance. On the Witwatersrand, workers were exhausted, having involved 
themselves in a sustained build-up to Y l  Day, then having endured a prolonged 
period of victimization. 
The calling of the strike was dictated by events in parliament and not by 
the mood or the level of preparation of the workers. The ANC year-end report makes 
no attempt to analyse critically the response or the results of the strike. A major 
weakness was the failure to analyse the role of the mass strike in the process of 
political change. The stated aim of the strike was the defeat of the Unlawful 
Organizations Bill, the assumption being that the government would make concessions 
when faced with this wide-scale protest. This remained the fundamental tenet of the 
mass strikes throughout %he 1950s, and was the flaw in its conception as a weapon for 
political change. Instead of concessions, the Security Police, in co-operation with 
business, again put into effect a cmpaign of widespread repression. (8) 
June 26th became known as ll'Freedom Day", and was to mark the beginnings of 
the Defiance Campaign and the historic Congress of the People in 1955. It was also 
the date on which the next political strike was called. When inspired by the upsurge 
of militancy in the wake of mass boycott action early in 1957, the Congress Alliance 
called for a day of protest, prayer and dedication to take place on June 26 1957. 
The June 1957 strike, announced ambiguously in demonstration tenas with 
religious undertones, failed to materialize in all regions except the Witwatersrand 
=id Port Elizabeth, two areas that had recently been at the centre of mass boycott 
action. Preparations in these areas were vigorous, and militant posters urged workers 
to strike for a £1.00 a d q y  and the rejection of passes and permits, in sharp 
contrast to the other regions' evening prayer meetings offered for the deliverance of 
South Africa from Rationalist oppression. 
In Johannesburg, Vereeniging and Port Elizabeth the strike was estimated to 
be 70-80% effective, bringing a number of factories to a standstill and affecting 
essential semices. It was most solid in unionized factories where shop stewards had 
been active. The positive response shows both the relevance of the demands and how 
past resistance, in this instance the mass boycott, is a stepping stone: the struggle 
between capital and labour cannot be won with one blow. It is an ongoing process, 
each stage of which transfoms consciousness and strengthens organization. This does 
not occur mechanistically, but depends upon political leadership. A weakness of the 
strategy was the failure to follow up the mass strike with further action at the point 
of production. The Alliance supported industrial strikes when they occurred a d  
intervened in the negotiating process, but did not actively encourage this f o m  of 
action. Turok argued that workers were easily victimized for participating in such 
action and that more was achieved through the national strike campaigns which created 
"a climate which forced the government to give concessions". (g) This is correct in 
that from 1957 there was a flurry of Wage Board activity and new detemina%ions, 
reversing the trend of declining real wages after 1957. (10) 
There is, however, no automatic transmission from economic to political 
gains. The interlacing of mass political with industrial strikes could haire more 
effectively achieved this transmission in that each strike enriches the experience 
and advances the level of consciousness of the proletariat. Each factory strike gives 
rise to discussions about working conditions and helps workers appraise them. There 
emerges a sense of unity and a shared recognition of community of purpose. It also 
prepares and promotes illdividuaJ. workers who emerge as leaders and gives others an 
example of how to fight successfully with owners. In South Africa it eaucates 
politically, for strike action, being illegal, makes war waged against the factory 
owner simultaneously war against the State. Evidence suggests that victimization in 
the wake of mass strike action was no less severe than in the case of industrial 
strikes, the workers' only defence being unity at the work place. 
The success of the strike in the two regions generated an overconfidence 
amongst the leadership, a naive faith that the Black proletariat could be mobilized 
at will. In April 1958, the workers were called upon to "make themselves heard" as 
the Whites went to the poll. Luthulils original call for "a dw of mass prayer and 
dedication to the freedom cause was radicalieed, by an upsurge of worker militancy, 
into a call for a prolonged national strike. 
This militancy was reflected at the SACTCT National Workers! Conference (NWC) 
held in Johannesburg on March 15th. During February numerous regional conferences 
were organized to stimuLate interest and participation in the National event. Workers 
were mobilized around the £1.00 a day slogan and the conferences called for mass 
action at election tkne in support of this demand. The NWC resolved that in election 
week there would bena week of national stay at home protest and demonstration in 
support of the people's demandsq\ (11) The twin slogans were vForward to a S1.00 a 
day victoryn and "The Nationalists must go". The former dominated the proceedings, 
with the connection between poverty wages and influx control. being made. Workers 
wem prepared for defiant, illegal action as sections called for the destruction of 
pass books before election day. 
These conferences strained the ANCts class alliance, as sections of the 
leadership reacted to the prominence given to the working class, arguing that the 
I 
conferences were purely trade W o n  affairs and therefore did not necessitate their 
active support. Tumk outlines the Qmamics that gave rise to these tensions and I 
the effort to ameliorate them: 
... the Congress movement gradually became more 
progressive and more proletarian. As things got more 
difficult it was those with the least to lose and the 
least illusions that came to the top. Working class 
comrades became more involved and people with class 
ideology cane to the fore because they were more 
militant and more committed, which is not to SW that 
there were no committed petty bourgeoisie. But in the 
wealth, in the weight of the thing, the pressures of 
the proletaxian elements were stronger and sometimes 
one in fact had to be careful that this tendency did 
not become hegemonic. (12) 
Preparatory work for the strike was poor, and organizational efforts 
centred mainly on the distribution of Luthuli~s letter of appeal to the White 
electorate. The leadership, including that of the GP, so-t to woo the more liberal 
sections of the White ruling class, the underlying assumption being that economic 
growth inevitably produces political reform. At this time Harmel, a leading CP 
theorist, wrote: 
khe ty-pe of despotism we still endure in the Union in 
this age ... is a kind of freak, an anachronism which 
cannot hope much longer to survive. (13) 
The inadequate preparation, coupled with the subordination of the £1.00 a 
day demand, resulted in a poor response, with only a few areas and industries 
participating. (14) Tambo called off the strike after the first day. The electdw 
results revealed increased support for the Nationalists. 
Despite its failure, this campaign was an important moment in the resistance 
struggle, for it led to conclusions vital to the maturing of Black opposition. The 
ANC year-end conference stated: 
The election has shattered the illusion of change 
through the electoral system ... the Nationalists 
can be got out of power not by voters but by the 
voteless masses, by extra-parliamentary means. (15) 
The report concluded that the strike had failed because of: 
1. insufficient preparation, four weeks being hopelessly inadequate to 
mobilize on a national scale; 
2. , the lack of tight organization: Duma Nokwe drew attention to the 
failure to implement the "M Plan" with its emphasis on slow and 
tedious house to house work, whereas at present the ANC preferred 
=ss meetings; 
3. inattention to political education; 
4. disunity within the ANC because of the AfricWst opposition and 
because sections of the ANC failed to involve themselves with the 
working class. 
The leadership failed, however, to discuss the relevance of the strike slogans. 
Arenstein argues thatuBlack workers did not identify with the call. The elections 
were too remote a factor from their daily lives .'l (16) The role of trade -unionism in 
the strike was ignored and there was no comparative analysis of the participation of 
1 organized and unorganized workers. The CP post-mortem, hol~ever, concluded that mass 
l action depended upon the form and level of working class organization. This needed 
1 to take two foms: one, a renewed drive to establish and develop SACTU unions; two, 
the launching of factory committees that would not simply be trade union committees 
but groupings of advanced workers which would combine both industrial and political 
functions. Walter Sisulu and Ben Turok drew up the document on the role of factory 
committees, a document that was "absolutely seminal ... a point of departure as far 
as the trade union and Congress movements were concerned1'. (17) Zkom early 1959 the 
I ANC and SACTU campaigned for the establishment of factory committees. 'This raised 
l the work to a new level: 
l 
SACTU was no longer quite so office orientated ... more 
and more people were to work informally from home, 
going to the factories aYld setting up factory 
committees, rather than coizcentrating solely on the 
office complaints style of work ... there was a change 
in orientation towards grass roots work in the factories. 
l 
, This emphasis on forms of organization nore deeply embedded in township and 
factory was an important advance, but the plms failed to mature. The Africanistsf 
campaign upset the more detailed preparations of the Alliance in 1960, with Sharpeville 
ushering in not only a new timetable but also a new strategy of resistance. 
' . 
I 
VL 
The Transvaal Africanists maintained that the failure of the 1958 strike 
proved that the ANC was out of touch with "mass sentiment", a criticism which led to 
the expulsion of leading Africanists, generating deep division within the November 1958 
Transvaal Provincial Congress and resulting finally in the f o m l  establishment of the 
PAC in April 1959. The ANC was accused of trde-fusing" latent nationalist sentiments 
and of creating an ideological void by neglecting the nation-building principles of 
the 1949 Prog'rme of Action. The PAC was soon organizing a "do or die" struggle 
against the pass laws, founded on the optimistic belief that the masses had taken the 
message of Nationalism to heart and that what was needed was bold leadership which 
could inspire the masses with heroic examples of self sacrifice in a "no bail, no 
defence, no fine campaign". (18) 
The PAC leadership had acknowledged from the outset that efficient 
organization was fundamental to any campaign, yet their tough, optimistic talk led them 
to pay scant regard to their serious organizational shortcomings, thus replicating the 
mistakes that the ANC had made in 1958. Sobukwe announced that members of the PAC 
would surrender themselves for arrest on March 21st. Contrary to the leadershiprs 
expectations, the response to the call was negligible in all regions except the 
Vereeniging industrial complex, where the PAC organized without competition from the 
ANC. At Sharpeville police opened fire on the protesters, killing 67 and indming 186. 
It was a watershed event, one of immense political significance, that altered the course 
of Black resistance in South Africa; it played a part in the Alliancels turn to armed 
struggle as a means of achieving their goals. SACTU organizer Xhaqyile reflected: 
The Sharpeville incident made me think it's high time 
,now that we did something new. It had a big impact on 
me and I believed that if we continued trying to 
mobilize ourselves as before we wouldlnat have a chance. (19) 
More immediately, Shrpeville zYld associated events at Langa created a 
crisis when the initial political action on the passes was t ~ s f o ~ d  & extended 
into other industrial centres. Rosa Luxemburg, theorizing on the mass strike, 
hi&lights not only how pure economic, partial trnde union conflicts n;ul hhrou& 
stages into mass political demonstrations but also how political mass action, can break 
up into a mass of economic strikes: 
After every foaming wave of political action a 
fructifying deposit remains behind from which a 
thousand stalks of economic struggle shoot forth ... 
the political struggle is the permmen% fertiJ.ization 
of the soil of economic struggle. Cause znci effect 
continually change places ... The worker, suddenly 
aroused to activity by the electric shock of political 
action, immediately seizes the weapon lying nearest his 
hand for the fight against his condition of econodc 
slavery: the stoqy gesture of the political struggle 
causes him to feel with ~mexpected intensity %he weight 
an-d the pressure of his economic chains. (20) 
This was the dynaaic set in motion by the shootings. Chief LuVdi ha,d a,ppealed to all 
Africans to observe a day of mourning on Nonday the 28th by staying away from work. He 
combined the call for a "top level meeting of African leaders with the Peaders of all 
political parties" with the radical action of publicly bming his pass book, swing: 
'T have no intention of ever carrying a reference book again, and I hogs %hat all other 
Africans will voluntarily follow my example." (21) A day after Luthulik statement 
and pas8 burning, the State retreated and the head of police issued instructions: "No 
Ban-tu, male or female, is to be asked for his or her refexence book or any other 
documents. No Bantu will be taken into custody because he is not in possession of his 
reference book.!' (22) But repression was ~irilult~aneou~ly interaified as Justice 
Minister Ekcasmus extended the public meeting ban to 49 additional magisterial districts. 
Luthuli was a leader of influence amongst Black workers and pessaurts, but he never 
developed a worker ideology. Thus, at the moment when %he state retreated on the pass 
laws, instead of escalating the struggle by calling for a prolonged general strike, he 
called for a dw of mourn;ing. The upsurge of militancy was not channelled along a 
more revolutionary path and so the leadership failed to take advantage of the shifts in 
the balance of class forces realized by the crippli~?, week-long strike. IPurok 
admitted: 
1960 was a testing tine ... the militancy was growing 
outside but we were SO preoccupied with the leg61 
processes. We didnrt have the ri&t conception of 
revolution as opposed to pressure. We &ids~t make the 
riglit break. 
Events at this junctme revealed that the ~o~lsing class were prepared to move 
beyond the leadership. They extended the one-day stay at home call into a prolonged 
strike, mass marches, and rioting. It was a peak of resistance that was not again to 
occur until the Soweto uprising 16 years later. On the day of mourning an estipaated 
50,000 Blacks attended a funeral in Langa, where PAC orators called for the str2ce to 
go on until Black Cemds were met. The Cape Town strike lasted until April 4th, 
crippling commerce and industry. In Dur'aan there was a near total response from the 
Cato Pllanor and Lamontville workers. The Governmentls response was to declare a state 
of emergency and ban the AHC and PAC. Widespread arrests followed aYld the resistance 
was eventually broken. The strike action ended, and defiant pass b d n g  was replaced 
by long queues of workers at Government offices waiting for new reference books. 
Exhaustion and demoralization replaced militancy. The ANC underground called for a 
week-long strike beginnisl;T on Bp~il lgth, but it received no popular support. 
The situation led to the SACP issuing a pamphlet, What next?, which 
speculated on -the future form of the struggle in the ligbt of the massive state 
repression. The question was aaa1ysed in terns of violence or non-violence. At the 
CP annual conference, December 1960, the Party decided that the new form of struggle 
should be one of economic sabotage as a first stage to guerrilla warfare. The new 
strategy was accepted by the AXC leadenship, and so the foundation was laid for future 
struggles. 
Arenstein is extremely critical of this decision, as this lenghty quote shows: 
This was a very, very grave mistake which had terrible 
effects on the growth of the mass movement in South Africa. 
To my mind certain of the leaders were always dissatisfied 
with taking things over a long term. They were keen to try 
to get things settled as qyickly as possible. Of course 
one must take into account the feeling of frustration from 
Black leaders. Taking into account their frustration one 
can understand why a number of them do so, but when one 
considers that the actual drive for this sort of activity 
came from the SACP, then one realizes that it goes deeper. 
Generally Marxists have been against this type of activity - 
economic terrorism - because it isolates the movement from 
the masses. There was no necessity for the SACP to launch 
this activity. They obviously misread the situation 
completely. There were two reasons for the decision: one 
was the success of Castro in Cuba and the other was the 
Pondo uprising which made a number of the SACP leaders feel 
that the time was now ripe for the violent overthrow of the 
Government ... It was a false analogy. As far as the Pondo 
uprising was concerned, by the time they took the decision 
the Pondas themselves had decided to take the question of 
violence no further aYld were looking forward to other 
methods of struggle. It was a complete mismderstaanding of 
the situation and a completely wrong analysis of the forces 
at work. 
Turok admitted that this decision had consequences for the development of 
the mass movement: 
a huge gdp developed between the leading force and the mass. 
The mass didn't know what to do. 
The sabotage campaign led to more extreme repression by the State. The 90 Day Act 
resulted in a new phase of detentions and the introduction of torture which provided 
the State with invaluable illformation on resistance plans and hence the arrest of the 
most experienced SACTU and ANC leaders. This was a long-term set-back to the 
development of the workers f movement, leaving a vacuum throughout the 1960s. 
Before the Alliance embarked on this new campaign of sabotage, efforts were 
renewed during the first months of 1961 to pressure the Government into calling a 
National Convention of all political leaders to work out an a1l;ermtir.e to a "Whites 
only" Republic. The protest strike was to be the means. Drawing on the lessons of 
1958, the organizational preparations for the strike were meticulous, revealing 
an ironic maturityin tae context of the decision to turn away from organized mass 
resistance. 
A National Action Council was elected at an "All-in Africa Conferencen 
representing a wide variety of African organizations. The NAC saw as its prime 
objective "the full expla.nation to the entire population of the true meaning and 
significance of the campaign for a National convention1'. It was linked to grievances 
over rentals, passes, Bantu Authorities, Group areas and education. An effort was to 
be made to reach out to all - urban and rural workers, reserve peasants, and workers 
housed in oompounds of mines, municipalities, docks and railways. The country was 
zoned into regions with full-time orgaaizers appointed in each. In all these tasks 
SACTU played a vital role. 
A meeting on April 14th decided rmminously that, in view of the Government 
and Opposition partiest negative response, a three-day strike and demonstraGion would 
be called to coincide with the proclamation of a Republic, (23) The Statecs response 
to the preparations was predictable: police, army and ci-tizen force units appeared on 
a scale more extensive than for any of the earlier strikes. Ten thousand Blacks were 
arrested during the course of intensive raids and a new law entitling the Government 
to detain a person for 12 days without bail was passed. 
On the second day of the protest strike, MaYldela told the workers to return 
as the strike was "not the rational success 1 had hoped for. This closes a chapter in 
our methods of political action." (24) The daily press claimed that the strike had 
failed. A week later, concluded that this was the biggest nitional dtrike on 
a political issue ever staged in the history of South Africa. (25) It is possible to 
move beyond these conflicting generalizations because this is the one national strike 
that has been surveyed. (26) The survey draws the conclusion that seemed evident in 
the earlier strikes but which could only be speculated upon because of the lack of 
evidence : 
Workers who are organized into trade unions are more 
responsive to a political call than unorganized 
workers, Their trade union ac-1;j.vi-b~ has given them 
heightened political consciousness and they a180 
respond more readily when the appeal is made on a 
factory basis as opposed to a residential basis as 
they feel that there is less chance of dismissal if 
the whole factom is involved. 
Despite detailed plans for a second phase in the campaign for a national 
convention, based on the ccncept of widespread non-cooperation rooted in a strengthened 
industrial organization, it was never launched. The most experienced organizers were 
by now fully engaged in the sabotage campaign and had not the time to follow the plans 
throw. The nature of their work isolated 'them from the working class. It is one of 
the ironies of history that this should occur at a moment when, as the evidence of 1961 
suggests, the Black labour movement was developing, and further that this was crucial 
to effective resistance. 
VIII 
The above analysis has tried to show that mass action, in the form of 
political strikes, failed for reasons more complex than repressive State action. These 
relate to the role of leadership and organization in the process of change. What 
emerges quite clearly is the leadershipas conception of the proletariat as a vehicle to 
be used in pressure politics. ThisPaizs contradictozy, because at various points the 
proletariat broke through the lhits imposed by the leadership. This paper has 
stressed the critical need of a strong trade union base, linked to class conscious 
leadership, as the essential prerequisite for political change in South A£rica. The 
alternative is a mindless militarism. 
l 
1. For details on wages, see W. F. Steeulkamp, "Bantu Wages in South Africaf1, m, 
June 1962. SAD3 Su~veys, 1949-50, p. 70, and 1956-7, pp. 166-171, reveal that 
the majority of Africans were living below the poverty datum line. Unpublished 
work of the Warwick Southern Africa project details changes in the labour process. 
(2) "The 1946 African Mine Workers' strike and the political economy of South Africaf1, 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1975. 
(3) See Karis & Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 2, p. 452. Draft report of 
the NEC of the ANC, December 15-17 1950. 
(4) Official estimates of the extent of the response were contradictory. For example, 
between 40,000 and 50,000 workers out of a total of 160,000 in the South Western 
Townships were said to have stayed at home, that is approximately 30%. Yet trains 
arriving from these townships carried only 3009 of the usual number of passengers. 
(5) Karis & Carter, op. cit., p. 452. 
(6) For example, James Phillips, executive member of CNETU, lost his job. 
(7) Karis & Carter, op. cit., p. 444. 
(8) Natal Indians suffered most. There was a massive switch over from Indian to 
African workers, dramatically increasing Indian unemployment. 
(9) Interview, December 1977. 
(10) New determinations were drafted for the laundry trade in all principal towns, the 
bread industry on the Witwatersrand and Pietemitzburg, stevedoring in the four 
main ports, clothing in the Transvaal, and the meat trade in the principal centres. 
(11) 13th February 1958. 
(12) Interview, December 1977. 
(13) Africa South, Vol. 3, No. 2, January-March 1959. 
(14) In Johannesburg, the majority of laundry workers came out, as did the Durban dock- ( 
workers. The main response came from Sophiatown and Newclare townships in 
Johannesburg and New Brighton in Port Elizabeth. 
(15) Karis & Carter, Vol. 3, p. 441. 
(16) Interview, May-June 1977. 
(17) Interview with Turok, December 1977. 
(18) Turok claims that the ANC had already planned a similar campaign a3ld that secret 
documents had been stolen. 
(19) Interview, September 1977. 
(20) M. A. Waters, Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, pp. 185-7. 
(21) Natal Mercury, 28 March 1960. 
(22) Ibid. 
(23) Minutes of NCC, 14 April 1961. 
(24) Natal Mercury, 30 May 1961. 
(25) 8th June 1961. 
(26) The survey is based on organizerss reports. 
